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I. 
THE UTAH STATUTES REIMPLEMENTING THE DEATH PENALTY 
DC NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN GREGG V, GEORGIA, 
PROFFITT V, FLORIDA, AND JUREK V, TEXAS» 
The United States Supreme Court has declared that 
direct review by Appellate Courts of the appropriateness of 
each death sentence case is a crucial procedure which must be 
employed in any capital punishment scheme in order to satisfy 
1 
the requirements of Furman v. Georgia. 
In these cases, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
principles first announced in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972). As Justice Stewart stated in Gregg v. Georgia: 
"Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded 
a sentencing body on a matter so grave or the deter-
mination of whether a human life should be taken or 
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed 
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly 
arbitrary or capricious action." 96 S. Ct. at 2932. 
In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart, in announcing 
the judgement of the court, stated that because of the uniqueness 
of the death penalty, it cannot be imposed under any sentencing 
procedure that creates a substantial risk that it may be inflicted 
in an arbitrary or capricious manner. In reviewing the capital 
penalty statute of the State of Georgia, the court, at several 
1. Gregg v. Georgia, U. S. , 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, U. S. , 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976); 
Jurek v. Texas, U. S. , 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, U. S. , 96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976) 
Roberts V. Louisiana, U. S. , 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976). 
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points in the opinion, emphasized the function of the special 
expedited direct review of capital cases which was followed 
by the Georgia Supreme Court. A plurality of the Justices 
acknowledged that these special review procedures consti-
tuted an important additional safeguard to check the possibility 
2 
of the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 
Under the law of Georgia, the appellate court 
is required by statute to automatically review each sentence 
of death and determine whether it was imposed under the influence 
of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports the 
jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and 
whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to sentences 
3 
imposed in similar cases. The Georgia Supreme Court in Coley 
v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 204 S. E. 2d 612 (1974) has held that 
a death sentence will be set aside on the appellate level if 
excessive in light of comparative sentences imposed for 
similar cases. 
The Court placed great emphasis on the ability of 
the Georgia Supreme Court to determine in each case whether 
the death sentence is excessive or disproportional. As Justice 
Stewart stated: 
"The proportionality review substantially eliminates 
the possibility that a person will be sentenced to 
die by the action of an aberrant jury. 96 S. Ct. 2940." 
2. See the concurring opinion of Justice White, with whom the 
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined. 
3. Georgia Code Ann. Section 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975). 
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4 
In Proffit v. Florida, the death penalty statute 
of Florida provides for sentencing in all cases by the trial 
judge instead of a jury and required automatic review by the 
5 
Supreme Court of Florida of all death sentence cases. The 
trial judge, not the jury, in sentencing under Florida's 
system must justify the imposition in every case of the death 
sentence with written findings to the State Supreme Court. 
In State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (1973), the Florida Supreme 
Court held that they had the duty on appellate review of 
capital cases that went beyond the scope of review in other 
criminal cases. The court stated that Supreme Court review 
should guarantee that aggravating and mitigating reasons 
present in one case lead to a similar result to that reached 
under similar circumstances in another case and the appellate 
court must determine whether or not the punishment of death 
in any individual case is too great. 
The United States Supreme Court in upholding the 
Florida death penalty scheme under Furman placed great 
emphasis on these review procedures. The Court stated that 
the conscientious review by a court with state-wide jurisdiction 
4. Supra,, Page 1. 
5. Fla. State. Ann., Sec. 921.141(4) (Supp. 1976-1977). 
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would assure the consistency, fairness, and rationality that 
would prevent the imposition of the death sentence in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner. The Court noted that because 
the procedure developed by the Florida court, the Florida 
court had in effect adopted the type of proportionality 
6 
review mandated in the Georgia statute at issue in Gregg, 
In Texas, the conviction of death is subject to 
7 
automatic review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals* 
8 
In Smith v. State, the Court of Appeals of Texas examined 
carefully the death sentence imposed in that case as to the 
appropriateness of its imposition in light of the prior 
history of the defendant. In Jurek v. Texas the Supreme 
Court found that the Texas appellate procedure provided 
means which would promote the evenhanded, rational, and 
consistent imposition of the death penalty in that state. 
In Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the death sentence as applied 
in North Carolina was unconstitutional because the mandatory 
death penalty system violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. An important factor in this decision by the 
court was the absence in North Carolina of the proper appellate 
review process. In North Carolina the court found that neither 
6. Proffitt v. Florida at 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976). 
7. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 (1973). 
8. No. 49,809 (Feb. 18, 1976). 
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at the trial or appellate level could the judiciary check 
the arbitrary and capricious exercise of the sentencing 
9 
in death penalty cases. 
The Utah statutes, Utah Code Annotated 76-3-206 and 
76-3-207 (Supp. 1975) do not outline an appellate review process 
which meets the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Under the 
scope of review employed in the State of Utah in criminal 
cases, this court has no means to promote the evenhanded, 
rational, and consistent imposition of the death penalty on 
a statewide basis. Furthermore, the appeal procedure in 
Utah is discretionary, not mandatory and automatic as in 
each of the three cases before the Supreme Court. 
Therefore, the sentence of the appellant imposed 
under their capital punishment statutory scheme is unconsti-
tutional and should be reversed. 
9. See also, Roberts v. Louisiana, supra, at 96 S. Ct. 
3007 re appellate review. 
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II. 
POINT II. THE DEATH PENALTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE 
IT DOES NOT SERVE A COMPELLING STATE 
INTEREST WHICH COULD NOT BE FULFILLED 
BY A LESS DRASTIC MEANS 
The appellant hereby incorporates Point II of 
original brief. 
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III. 
POINT III. APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE WHICH 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL SHOULD BE REVERSED, 
AND PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-3-207 (4) SHOULD BE REMANDED TO 
THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE APPELLANT TO 
BE SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT 
The appellant hereby incorporates Point III 
of original brief. 
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AMENDED IV 
A) THE SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
THE SENTENCE IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE 
AND EXCESSIVE IN RELATION TO THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE 
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AND THE DEFENDANT'S INVOLVEMENT IN 
THAT OFFENSE, 
B) THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE OF DEATH SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
JUDGES IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY. 
The appellant submits that if the court should 
find that the death penalty statute in Utah is not per se 
unconstitutional, the aforementioned recent decisions by 
the Supreme Court require that this court exercise the type 
of special, direct review of death penalty cases specified by the 
Supreme Court. 
As outlined in Amended Point I of this brief, a 
mandatory, special, direct review of the appropriateness of 
each individual death sentence is a crucial procedure that 
must be employed to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Paragraph (3) of Utah Code Annotated 76-3-207 
(Supp. 1975) provides: 
"Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence 
is of death, the supreme court, if it finds prejudicial 
error in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside 
the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial 
court, in which event the trial court shall impose the 
sentence of life imprisonment." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law Scho l, BYU.
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Under the above quoted section, this court has the 
ability to exercise the obligation placed upon state appellate 
courts by the United States Supreme Court to assure that the 
death penalty in Utah is not inflicted in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner. By reviewing each case in which the penalty 
of death is imposed, this court can determine whether in fact 
the sentence of the individual defendant is or is not dispro-
portional to the offense committed. In each case the court 
should review the sentence in light of the circumstances of 
the crime, the aggravating and mitigating factors present, 
and other sentences for similar crimes. The court by employing 
"proportionality review" can substantially eliminate the pos-
sibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action 
of an arbitrary or capricious manner. 
This court also has the duty to carefully review 
the entire trial and sentencing procedure of each death penalty 
case and to reverse the death sentence if any prejudicial 
error is found by the court in any phase of the trial. As 
the United States Supreme Court stated in Gregg: 
"There is no question that death as a punishment 
is unique in its severity and irrevocability... 
When a defendant's life is at stake, the court 
has been particularly sensitive to insure that 
every safeguard is observed. 96 S, Ct. at 2932. 
The Utah Supreme Court has traditionally employed 
a special review standard in capital cases. State v. Riley, 
41 Utah 2d 225, 126 P. 294 (1911); State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 
350, 2 P. 2d 1050 (1931); State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P. 
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2d 1003 (1944); and State v. Materi, 119 Utah 143, 225 P. 
2d 325 (1950). In these cases the court has held that it 
has a duty to review the entire record that does not exist 
in ordinary criminal appeals, and will raise questions of 
error on its own motion. In State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 
230, 282 P. 2d 323 (1955) this court said: 
"Under such circumstances (a capital case) it is 
our duty to scrutinize with care the propriety of 
all aspects of the proceedings, at 332." 
The court expressed this concept again in State v. 
Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512 (.1968) in another manner 
in reversing one defendant's death sentence: 
"... with the defendant's life at stake, 
this court should not hazard a guess. The 
[evidence at issue] could very well have 
tipped the scales in favor of the death 
penalty" at 515. 
In light of the foregoing standards of review the 
appellant submits: (1) That the penalty of death in appellant's 
case is disproportionate and excessive in relation to the offense 
which the defendant was convicted and the defendant's involve-
ment in the offense; (2) The evidence introduced at the trial 
and hearing and sentence does not support the sentence of death 
in light of the mitigating factors present in appellant's case. 
Therefore, the court should reverse the judgement 
of the lower court and either remand the case for retrial 
or set aside the death penalty. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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V THROUGH XI 
The appellant incorporates Points V, VI, VII, 
VIII, IX, X and XI from the original Brief, 
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• • • X I I . •'•'•:.. 
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO APPLY THE STANDARD 
OF PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE APPELLANT'S HEARING 
ON SENTENCE VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH AND 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
The United States Supreme Court has recently held 
that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the absence of any defense which may mitigate the degree 
of homicide. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) 
the Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the prosecution prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of the element of heat of 
passion on sudden provocation when the element is properly 
presented in a criminal case.. In that case, the question 
involved the law of the State of Maine which required the 
defendant to establish by a preponderance of evidence that 
he acted in the heat of passion to reduce the crime from 
murder to manslaughter. The ruling was founded on the 
fundamental concept that the reasonable doubt standard in 
criminal cases " . . . is the traditional burden which our 
system of justice deems essential." at 702. 
The Mullaney decision was an extension of the 
doctrine first developed in the case of In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 364 (1970), which required that the prosecution 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged. The State of Maine argued 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in Mullaney that the Win ship doctrine should not be 
extended in the case before the Court because the absence 
of the heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a 
fact necessary to constitute a crime. 
The Supreme Court rejected this distinction and 
stated that the State had chosen to distinguish in homicide 
cases between those who kill in the heat of passion and 
those who kill in the absence of this mitigating factor. 
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was found 
by the Supreme Court to apply not only when guilt or 
innocence is in issue but also when the degree of culpability 
is to be determined. The Court said: 
"The safeguards of due process are not 
rendered unavailable simply because a 
determination may have already have been 
reached that would stigmatize the defendant 
and that might lead to a significant impair-
ment of personal liberty." at 698. 
The Court recognized that potential difference in the 
restrictions of personal liberty which are involved in the 
punishments attendant to different degrees of the same crime 
may be greater than the potential deprivation of personal 
liberty involved when the issue is guilt or innocence in 
many lesser crimes. 
In death penalty cases, where the scales can be 
tipped in favor of either the life or death of the defendant, 
the potential for the deprivation of personal liberty by 
the State is substantial. No greater impairment of an 
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individual's rights, exists which is more drastic than the 
penalty of death* The safeguards of due process and the 
reasonable doubt standard must, a fortiori, apply when 
the death penalty is involved in the homicide. 
Under the Utah Law, the determination of whether 
the defendant will be punished by death or by life imprison-
ment depends upon whether the penalty of death is mitigated 
by any of the seven statutory enumerated circumstances which 
the judge or jury must consider in their decision. Utah 
Code Annotated 76-3-207 (Supp. 1975). The appellant contends 
that the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the absence of any mitigating factor which 
the defendant raises in the sentencing proceedings. If 
this burden is not placed on the State than the consequence 
of death can be imposed if the trier of fact finds that 
the evidence of the aggravating circumstances preponderates 
over the evidence of the mitigating factors. 
In the case before the Court, the trial judge 
instructed the jury during the penalty phase of the trial 
as follows: 
"There is no fixed standard as to the degree 
of persuasion needed for a particular sentence, 
as the law leaves that consideration to the 
jury, but the burden of proof to satisfy the 
jury that a death sentence is appropriate is 
on the State* (T. 4273) 
The trial court did not even instruct the jury that they 
must bring back the death sentence only upon a finding 
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based upon the preponderance of the evidence. 
The appellant submits that the trial judgefs failure 
to apply the traditional reasonable doubt standard to the 
determination of whether or not the death penalty would 
be imposed violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 7. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing Points, the appellant 
respectfully submits that the judgment rendered at trial 
be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for the 
purpose of a new trial, or that, in the alternative, this 
Court should order that appellant's sentence of death be set 
aside, and direct the trial court on remand to impose the 
sentence of life imprisonment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. GILBERT 
ROBERT VAN 
ATHAY 
SCIVER 
RANDALL GAITHER 
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